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By Alistair Bunkall, Middle East correspondent

Almost since the day the war started, there has been talk and speculation over what will happen on "the day after".

Who will run Gaza? Will there be the creation of an independent Palestinian state? Will Benjamin Netanyahu survive as Israeli prime minister? And who will take responsibility for failing to prevent the Hamas attacks?

So when will "the day after" arrive? Anyone expecting or hoping for a single moment of Israeli "victory" will likely be disappointed.

Even if Yahya Sinwar, Hamas's leader in Gaza, were to emerge from the underground tunnels waving a white flag, the military operation in Gaza wouldn't be over.

Israel has already declared 2024 "the year of war" and it will take months, possibly even years, for Israel to comprehensively sweep Gaza and destroy every last remnant of Hamas - if they're even able to do so at all.

For a moment of significance, I would look to Benny Gantz. The opposition leader is Israel's most popular politician, according to polling, and is the frontrunner to be the country's next prime minister should Netanyahu be forced out.

The former defence minister and IDF chief of staff joined the war cabinet, not as part of "a political partnership, but a shared fate".

He has no intention of remaining part of Netanyahu's government for longer than he needs to, and so the day he steps away will be a crucial moment and a challenge to Bibi.

As well as change in Israeli political leadership, Mahmoud Abbas, the long-serving and increasingly weak Palestinian president, might be forced to appoint a successor, or at least delegate duties to key political allies.

However, it will be extremely difficult to find someone acceptable to both Israel and the Palestinian people, many of whom have lost all faith in the ruling Palestinian Authority.

Lebanon remains an unresolved issue and if diplomatic attempts to push Hezbollah back from Israel's border are unsuccessful, Israel might be persuaded to take military action.

An Israeli drone strike, in Hezbollah-controlled southern Beirut, that killed a senior Hamas commander is a potentially major escalation.

A war with Lebanon would likely make the Gaza conflict seem small by comparison and could be very costly for Israel, as well as the Lebanese.

By Diana Magnay, Sky correspondent

As much as President ZelenAG°Ù¼ÒÀÖÔÚÏß¹ÙÍøy may not like the terminology, the most realistic assessment of where the war is at seems to be the one given by his top commander Valery Zaluzhny. "There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough," he told the Economist in November.

In other words, it's a stalemate.

Muddy - or by now frozen - rat-infested trenches skirting dense minefields stretch along a more than 2,000km frontline.

Up above, a myriad of drones grants eyes in the AG°Ù¼ÒÀÖÔÚÏß¹ÙÍø and strike capabilities to both sides. Barring better jamming capabilities, there will be little that moves those drones don't see.

In 2024, watch out for further mobilisation on both sides.

Ukraine for sure; Russia perhaps, but only once presidential elections are over. The political implications will be significant for both sides. Even in Russia, the public is not prepared to throw unlimited troops into battle.

Drones and improvements in electronic warfare will remain crucial. Ukraine says it needs technological breakthroughs in a variety of other areas too.

Those will depend on clever engineers or scientists, quite apart from the fact Ukraine needs consistency from the West in terms of munitions and other supplies.

On that front, Russia is ahead - its arms industry is on overdrive and North Korea and Iran are filling in the gaps.

Russia currently maintains a largely defensive position but signs of Western war fatigue may inspire Putin to go on the offensive.

He recently called Odesa a "Russian city", which may signal a long-term ambition to control the entire Black Sea coast, currently wildly ambitious but time seems to be on Putin's side here.

Expect Ukraine to become more ambitious in terms of strikes deeper into Crimea and Russian territory.

Then, there is the possibility of a Trump election win and the range of unknowns that might entail.

It would be safe to assume this war will not end in 2024.

By Helen-Ann Smith, Asia correspondent

One of the vice-presidential candidates in Taiwan's upcoming election described this vote as a choice between "war and peace" - but how accurate is this, and could Taiwan's election provoke conflict in Asia?

There is no doubt that the vote on 13 January will ramp up tensions in this already-strained region.

Taiwan is a self-governing island that China sees as a breakaway province. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly expressed his desire to "re-unify" it, using force if needs be. China views the fact that elections are being held at all as deeply provocative.

In addition, the most likely outcome, victory for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te, is the outcome that will be considered most egregious by Beijing.

This is because the DPP takes the hardest line against its powerful neighbour and also because Lai himself is a more provocative figure, with a history of making more openly pro-independence statements than others in his party.

There is no doubt the vote, and likely Lai victory, will spark more military activity in the strait.

Expect dozens, possibly hundreds, of Chinese fighter jets and bombers to fly towards Taiwan's airspace, many will likely cross the so-called median line into its air defence zone. There will also likely be large military drills involving warships and live missiles fired.

While a full-scale invasion is still very unlikely, the greatest risk is that increased military activity results in some sort of miscalculation or accident that either Taiwan, and/or its backers the US, feel they have no choice but to respond to.

President Biden has repeatedly said the US would defend Taiwan if necessary and there is concern that, despite recent diplomatic efforts, relations between China and the US are still bad enough that there may not be adequate "off-ramps" if things escalate.

By Yousra Elbagir, Africa correspondent

​​Sudan has been plunged into the worst episode of conflict it has seen since its civil war - which itself eventually tore Africa's largest nation into two.  

After the revolution in 2019 ousted long-time dictator Omar al Bashir, his former henchmen clung on to power and eventually turned on each other in an explosive confrontation.

Now, the country's army is fighting the second-largest armed faction � Janjaweed militia turned paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) � with shelling, airstrikes and bullets, killing at least 12,000 people and entrapping hundreds of thousands.

The chants for freedom, peace and equality that marked the revolution have now been replaced with calls for peace and humanitarian aid access.

Large areas of the capital Khartoum have been besieged by the RSF, who have been committing mass sexual violence against women and girls and occupying civilian homes. Humanitarian convoys have been attacked by both sides and millions are struggling to get access to basic necessities.

In Darfur, RSF-endorsed ethnic violence has ravaged non-Arab communities as army headquarters fall under their control.

In just eight months of war, 6.6 million people were forced from their homes.

Many more are expected to flee as international mediation fails to ensure a lasting ceasefire and funding for aid dries up. With no end in sight, Sudan's war will continue to create a horrifying humanitarian crisis and scatter an entire nation's population across the world.

By Stuart Ramsay, chief correspondent

The ruling military junta in Myanmar that took control of the country in a coup in February 2021 is facing its greatest threat after ethnic rebel armies joined forces and overran military outposts � and took out border crossings with neighbouring China.

The so-called Three Brotherhood Alliance came together to fight the junta's forces in Shan State, an area that borders both China and Thailand.

It is significant for two reasons.

Firstly, the armed groups have operated independently of each other for many years and basically existed to protect their own interests � be it business or territory � as opposed to fighting for a greater cause; that greater cause being a new federal structure for Myanmar, or Burma as it's also known.

Secondly, and this is very important, to date China has not done anything to stop them. While nominally supporting the junta over the years, in recent months relations have cooled, leaving the ruling military to deal with well-funded armed opposition forces, while also having to deal with ongoing uprising across the country.

The Brotherhood Alliance has indicated that, like many other ethnic armies in Myanmar, it now intends to bring down the military government and is aligning itself with the National Unity Government (NUG), the political coalition formerly deposed by the junta.

The NUG militias, generally known as the People's Defence Forces (PDF), are not well-armed or experienced but have been fighting the military since the 2021 coup.

Many have joined forces with ethnic armed organisations which have been fighting the military for decades.

While it's generally outgunned, the PDF resistance has been able to continue to operate mainly because of a huge influx of young professionals who left the country's major cities to take up arms.

The junta's conscript army still controls most of the major towns and roads and uses artillery and airstrikes to attack the PDF and ethnic armed groups who largely control the countryside.

The junta's attacks have targeted the civilian population, forcing many to leave their homes and find safety in the jungles of Myanmar.

The ruling military's hope is that by forcing the civilians from their homes, the people would eventually turn on the militias - but against their expectations, this has not happened. If anything, civilians appear to have increased their support for the armed opposition groups.

The resistance against the junta is nationwide, but their approach to toppling the military has long been fractured.

The coming together of the ethnic armies, the militias, and the PDFs could produce a momentum that the junta may simply be unable to control.

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