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Even at a time of constant Conservative infighting, the split is remarkable.

A Conservative prime minister, her national security establishment and the vast majority of the business community have lined up to declare that Huawei equipment is safe to use in the UK's 5G network.

Yet a group of Conservative MPs - including, we are told, several cabinet ministers, and the widely respected chair of the foreign affairs committee - are speaking out against this normally unassailable collection of interests.

They may not condone leaking from the National Security Council, but they will be thinking that, on the substance, the leaker was correct.

Their position is partly political. The opponents of the Huawei arrangement fear the UK is capitulating to China, potentially at the cost of its relationship with the US.

The Trump administration's hostile attitude towards China - essentially inviting allies to choose between the US and its superpower rival - has brought this geopolitical tension into a much sharper light.

But underlying this is a complicated technical argument over the nature of 5G, and with it the future of mobile networks.

After observing Huawei closely, the UK government has found numerous problems with the Chinese firm's equipment, including any number of serious security flaws.

But its experts believe these can be managed, as can the bigger issue of whether Huawei might use its access to the 5G network for espionage or even sabotage.

According to that leak from the National Security Council, the method it will use to do this is separating the "core" elements of the 5G network from the "non-core" - essentially, splitting off the software at the heart from the basic kit at the edge.

The reason this is so controversial is that many experts - including those working for the US and Australian governments - believe the distinction between core and non-core collapses in a 5G network, where much of the computing takes place at the edge.

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This verdict is not definitive. Speak to the UK's biggest telecoms companies and they'll tell you that they're confident in their ability to maintain the core/non-core distinction, just as they did in 4G (where Huawei equipment is firmly embedded).

It might be that, for instance, the UK's geography - the simple fact that it's smaller than the US or Australia - makes this more possible. As with any technology, it's not always possible to be entirely certain until you try it out.

But the question that needs to be answered by the prime minister and her security team is why the UK can mitigate this risk, when its partners in the FiveEyes cyber security alliance believe it is impossible.

And - perhaps most importantly - whether the UK would have reached a different decision if it had not already allowed Huawei in, over a decade ago?